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BRIEF OF APPELLEES
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Trial Court did not err as a matter of law when it concluded that four patented mining
claims held by the Gold Stream Corporation (hereinafter "GSC") were transferred to Appellee
Douglas J. Hanks. This Court should therefore find that the conveyance of said mining claims
to Appellee Douglas J. Hanks was valid and proper and should therefore agree with the findings
of fact and conclusion of law of the Trial Court.

II.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal from the July 7, 2004, Ruling of the Fourth District Court, Utah County, State
Of Utah , (The honorable Judge Gary D. Scott) denying Plaintiff/ Appellant's request for
Judicial Dissolution of GSC. This Court has jurisdiction for an appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated: 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2004).

III.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

1.

Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law when it concluded that the patented
claims were properly transferred to Appellee Douglas Hanks?

Questions of law are reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the Trial Court.
3.

Did the Trial Court's findings of fact support its conclusion that the mining claims
were properly conveyed to Appellee Douglas Hanks?
Findings of fact must be found "sufficient to provide a sound foundation for the judgment".

IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

Utah Code Ann: 16010a-704
Action without meeting

Utah Code Ann: 16-10a-1202(1) (2004)
Sale of property requiring shareholder approval
This Utah Code was complied with relative to the issue before the Court.
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Utah Code Ann: 16-1 Oa-1402
Authorization of dissolution after issuance of shares.
This Utah Code was complied with relative to the issue before the Court.
Utah Code Ann: 16-10a-1405
Effect of dissolution
This Utah Code was complied with relative to the issue before the Court.

Utah Code Ann; 16-10a-1406
Disposition of known claims by notification
This Utah Code was complied with relative to the issue before the Court.

Utah Code Ann: 16- 10a-1407
Disposition of claims by publication
This Utah Code was complied with relative to the issue before the Court.
Utah Code Ann: 16-10a-1421
Procedure for and effect of administrative dissolution
This Utah Code does not apply relative to the issue before the Court.

Utah Code Ann: 16-10a-1430(2)
Grounds for judicial dissolution
This Utah Code does not apply relative to the issue before the Court.

V. STATEMENT OF APELLEE'S CASE
On March 29, 2002 Douglas Hanks received from Appellant Melvin Hunt a Summons,
Dated February 23, 2002, and a Complaint, dated February 11, 2002, against Albert E. Hunt,
Zera A. Hunt, and himself, (Douglas J. Hanks), who were three of the five former Directors of
Gold Stream Corporation (herein after GSC). [Summons and Complaint should have been filed
against all five former Directors], filed in the 4th Judicial District of Utah in Provo, in order to
obtain judicial dissolution of Gold Stream Corporation .
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On April 18, 2002, [with a verbal Power Of Attorney from Appellees Albert E. Hunt
and Zera A. Hunt], Appellee Douglas Hanks filed an answer in response to the complaint on
behalf of himself, Albert E. Hunt and Zera Hunt. Twelve months later, on or about April 22,
2003 the Appellees Hunt, Hunt and Hanks received from the 4th Judicial Court and "Order to
show cause" as to why the above noted case # 020400556 should not be dismissed. On or about
May 1st, 2003 the Appellee's received an amended complaint dated April 25, 2003, along with
a set of Interrogatories and a request for Production Of Documents. On May 26 & 27, 2003
Appellees Albert E. Hunt and Zera A Hunt provided Notarized Power of Attorney's to Appellee
Douglas J. Hanks to act on their behalf in respect to the Melvin J. Hunt Complaint. On May 30th
2003 there was an "Order To Show Cause" hearing wherein the Honorable Judge, Gary Stott
orders the Appellees to provide excess and review of the GSC records. On June 17, 2003 a meeting was held wherein the Corporate records were made available for review to the Appellant and
his attorney Milton Harmon. However! only the attorney attended the meeting and none of the records were reviewed. On August 18, 2003 a 2nd pre-trial conference was held wherein the attorney
mis-stated that he had reviewed the Corp records. The attorney asked for and received another
extension for another pre-trial conference to be held October 3 rd 2003, (which was extended to
October 16, 2003) and the Court noted that that would be the last conference prior to dismissal of,
or a trial date. On December 16 we attended another pre-trial conference wherein the Judge set a
trial date for February 5th, 2004, which was later extended to April 6, 2004. A bench trial was held
on April 6, 2004 wherein Appellee Hanks represented himself and the other two Appellees, Pro Se.
On July 7, 2004, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Appellee's Albert E. Hunt, Zera A.
Hunt and Douglas J. Hanks A modified judgment was issued by the trial court on July 13, 20($
5

The Appellant filed a Motion to Amend Judgment and Reconsider Ruling of July 16, 2004. On
July 26, 2004, Appellant filed a motion for a new trial. The motion for a new trial was denied on
September 14, 2004. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on November 30, 2005. The case was
transferred to the Utah Supreme Court on the December 9, 2004, and then transferred back to the
Utah Court of Appeals on December 10, 2004. Appellee Hanks filed a Response to Appellant's
Docketing Statement and Motion for Summary Disposition on December 30, 2004. (Appellants
Addendum A). Appellee Hanks erred in his response to Appellant's Docketing Statement because of his lack of understanding of the law, and the phrase "Manifest Error". His understanding
was that "Manifest" meant "obvious". The Court of Appeals denied the Motion and Stipulation on
February 9, 2005.

VI. APPELLEES STATEMENT OF FACT AND CORRECTIONS:
With corrections to the APPELLANTS statements UNDERLINED
1.

On July 1, 1963, GSC was incorporated in the state of Utah. The original incorporators

were Wilford Hunt, Albert Hunt, Melvin Hunt, and Sherald James. As far as the Appellee knows
the documentation for the formation of the corporation consisted of the Articles of Incorporation
and a Stockholders Agreement. One of the original incorporators. Appellant Melvin Hunt,
alleges that there was a Compensation Agreement. However no record of, or any mention of a
compensation agreement exists in any corporate records.
2.

The Appellant alleges that the so called Compensation Agreement states that all monies

advanced by a shareholder to the corporation above what other stockholders were able to contribute would be treated as a loan. The fallacy of this allegation is substantiated by the numerous
times that money, time and effort was compensated from Treasury Shares.
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3.

The Articles of Incorporation set forth a board of directors of five (5) members. The Arti

cles state that "Upon the affirmative vote of a majority of the issued and outstanding stock,
at any regular or special meeting of the stockholders called for the purpose, the directors may
be authorized to sell or otherwise dispose of any part or all of the assets of the corporation"
Ex 22, page 7, par 3
4.

GSC was started with limited financial resources and with the idea that all of the original

incorporators would be responsible for personal work and financial contributions to advance the
corporation. The Appellant's, Melvin J. Hunt, allegation that "he was the primary person conducting actual mining and sales operations for the corporation" is without foundation and is not
reflected in the corporate records or minutes. He was very involved for the first two years.
5.

In the early 1970's Appellee Douglas J. Hanks became a shareholder in GSC, first receiv-

ing shares as a finder's fee and then inheriting his father's shares when his father passed away.
This statement by the Appellant is basically true, but it raises another question for later consideration. Question: From where did Father Hanks receive his shares? From where did Douglas J.
Hanks receive his finders fee shares? The company records and Stock Ledger show that those
shares along with shares issued and/or sold to many others, were issued from Treasury stock
6.

In 1987 Gold Stream had three different groups of claims. There were the Four Patented

lode claims, which are the subject of the matter before the Court and are often referred to as the
Binz property, or the "Patented Claims". Then there was a second group of Placer claims located
down the hill from the patented lode claims, which are often referred to as the California Creek
claims. Then there was a third group of Lode claims located in Mill Creek Canyon which were
called the Smuggler Group. The Smuggler claims were located about twenty (20) miles, by road,
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away from the other two groups, or about three miles as the Crow flys. In 1987, before the Smuggler claims were lost to the Appellant Melvin Hunt, tests were run on some old milling pond
tailings that were on that property. One of the investors in another company of which the Appellee, Douglas Hanks was president, overheard our excitement about the results of those test
and asked to be involved. He asked to be partners in the recovery from the tailings. He provided money for that recovery project, but asked for his money back when Hanks advised him of
an error he (Hanks) made when reading the assay results. The statement that Appellant, made
wherein he states that: "The mill tailings invested in by the investor are on the Patented claims"
is incorrect. The tailing ponds are miles apart from the Patented claims.
7.

The Appellant's statement on his pg 7, par 2 that:: "that Hanks would loose his job", is

incorrect.. Hanks did negotiated an agreement, on behalf of GSC, granting the proposed partner,
a partnership in the tailing ponds recovery with an option to purchase said mill tailings., What
happened to the money received from that proposed partnership was not an issue before the court.
8.

On April 27, 1989, GSC held a meeting during which it approved assumption of the Hanks

position resulting from the tailing ponds fiasco. Appellee Zera Hunt made the motion to assume
the debt and Appellee Albert E. Hunt seconded the motion. Appellee Hanks abstained. Ex. 7.
9.

At the September 1,1989, GSC annual Shareholders meeting Appellee Hanks proposed

that the assets of the corporation, be sold or leased for not less than $1,150,000.00. Ex. 1 p.3.
Assets were sold to a third party interest, H & H Gold, that subsequently filed for Bankruptcy.
10.

The Appellant's statements that: "Appellee Albert F Hunt, as President of the corporation

and in his own personal capacity thereafter, began to assume control of the company and borrowed from the Appellant Melvin J. Hunt and his father, Wilford Hunt, all of the corporate
8

documents that they had in their possession, including the records that Appellant Melvin J.Hunt
had maintained as company Secretary; their stock certificates, and particularly the agreement
(compensation agreement). The documents borrowed have never been returned to Appellant
Melvin J. Hunt or his father, Wilford Hunt, and their present location is unknown, Appellee
Albert E. Hunt being unable to disclose their location", are not correct. After the Appellant
Hunt was replaced as secretary of GSC he turned over all of the corporate records, including the
minutes, to the next secretary, Mr. Hardy, who was secretary in 1966, who may have turned
them over to Mr.Mitchell, who may have turned them over to Mr. Fellows, who turned them
over to the Ap-pellee Douglas Hanks when he became secretary. Minutes of meetings held
during that time and which were taken by the Appellant Melvin Hunt as secretary are presently
part of the GSC re-cords. It is interesting to note that some of the old records of the Hunt Mining
Company includ-ing the stock ledger were also included, so it is hard to justify the allegation that
corporate records were borrowed and not returned. "Question": If stock certificates were
borrowed by Appellee Albert Hunt and not returned, where did the stock certificates, submitted
by the Appellant and his father, come from when they were re-called to be re-issued at the time
of the authorized stock split of 1976.
11.

On February 1, 1991. Appellee Albert F Hunt as President of GSC signed a promissory

note on behalf of GSC agreeing to pay Appellee Hanks $24,675.00 with an annual interest rate
of 5% to satisfy the obligation owed to Douglas Hanks as a result of the Tailing Ponds fiasco
Ex 9.
12.

The Appellant's statements that: "In January 17, 2002, GSC held two Meetings. The

first meeting, held on January 17, 2002, addressed the question of dissolution and the transfer
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of the mining claims, but neither issue was voted on. (R. 482 at 57: 15-23; R. 482 at 203: 4)
The meeting concluded with an agreement to meet again in March to further discuss these
questions", are incorrect. A shareholders meeting was called, due notice was provided to all the
shareholders of record. The meeting was suspended temporarily and reconvened, after proper
notice, on January 23, 2002. The part of the meeting addressed the question of dissolution
and the transfer of the mining claims. (Ex. 4). The Appellant's statement in par 3 that: "neither
issue was voted on", is not correct. On a Motion by Douglas Hanks and 2 nd by Dilworth Strasser,
it was proposed that Gold Stream divest itself of the four patented claims owned by GSC in favor
of Douglas Hanks as full and final payment owed to Douglas Hanks as provided in the minutes of
April 27, 1989. Ex 4, page 2. The Appellant's statement that: "The meeting concluded with an agreement to meet again in March to further discuss these questions Ex. 4, page 3", is incorrect.
The fact that the meeting was called properly is evidenced by the attendance of the Appellant and
the other attendee's.
13.

The Appellant'statement that: "Evidence introduced by Appellee Douglas Hanks suggests

that he received the mining claims 3 days later on January 20, 2002", is incorrect. The Motion to
liquidate the assets was made and carried at the re-convened meeting of January 23, 2002. As of
that moment it was intended that the Patented mining claims were to be transferred. Steps were
taken very quickly to transfer ownership from GSC to Douglas Hanks, or his assigns, as stated in
the subsequent board meeting of January 23, 2002. The Appellant's statement that: "The evidence
states that the mining claims had been transferred to Appellee Hanks in order to fulfill the promissory note signed by Appellee Albert E. Hunt on behalf of GSC", is incorrect because: 1) There
was no such evidence. 2) claims were transferred to COG as an "Assigns" as noted in subsequent
board meeting of January 23, 2002. 3) The statement that the Appellee, Albert E. Hunt signed
as president for GSC is correct.
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14. The mining claims were provided to Appellee Hanks as the only recognized legitimate
creditor to GSC. The Trial Court agreed with this conclusion. There were other legitimate
creditors who had vacated their claims or interest as shown in the Minutes of January 23, 2002.
All other claims were found to be not legitimate, and without proper foundation.
15. The statement by the Appellant that: "In addition, Appellee Hanks received the mining
claims before the board of directors of GSC voted on a proposed transfer. "Is incorrect because:
a) The shareholders voted on the transfer, not the board of Directors, b) The board implemented the transfer at a subsequently called Board Meeting held January 23, 2002, 7:00 pm. At that
board meeting It was moved and 2 nd to convey the Patented claims to Douglas Hanks or his
assigns.
16. On January 23, 2002, the shareholders meeting was re-convened. At this meeting board
elections were held and Appellees Albert Hunt, Zera A. Hunt, Douglas Hanks, along with Dilworth Strasser were re-elected as Directors. Marilyn Hunt was also elected. Ex. 4.
17.

After the election Appellee Hanks moved that the assets of the corporation be liquidated

and the ownership of the patented mining claims be conveyed to himself, Appellee Hanks, as
full and final payment of monies owed to him. Ex. 4. The motion passed and was carried. This is
a correct statement, however it was decided in the subsequent board meeting to make the transfer
to an "assignes" rather than to the Appellee Douglas Hanks. Finally, Appellee Hanks proposed
and Appellee Zera Hunt seconded a motion that GSC be dissolved. Motion carried.
18. This statement should be corrected to read On January 23, 2002, at 7:00 pm, GSC held a
board meeting and resolved that the patented mining claims be transferred to COG, as an assigns
of Douglas Hanks. Notice of the resolution was given to the shareholders shortly thereafter.
19.

During the January 23, 2002, meeting there was no need to make any reference to the
11

value of the assets of the corporation since the corporation was deemed as insolvent and since
the shareholders were not willing to pursue any further development. The unfounded allegation
by the Appellant that there was a "Compensation Agreement" was dismissed by the court. The
Appellant Melvin Hunt attended some shareholders meetings, and as a director he attended some
board meetings. QUESTION: Why didn't the Appellant raise the issue of the alleged "Compensation Agreement" in any of those meetings? There was no need for the shareholders to be made
aware of G S C s failure to pay its corporate taxes for 2001 since the Secretary Treasure provided
notice that GSC was insolvent and had received notice that the State was not interested in persuing any further action.
20.

Appellant's statement that: "The only reference to any of the debts and obligations owed

by GSC was a reference to monies due as compensation for the tailings pond fiasco debt which
Appellee Hanks said GSC owed to him" may be correct. However! Appellee Hanks satisfied that
obligation back in 1987.
21. The record will show that on February 13, 2002 the State of Utah dissolved GSC by a administrative action for failing to pay its corporate taxes and for failing to file its annual report for the
year 2001, and after the Secretary Treas provided notice to the State that GSC was insolvent and
had voted to dissolve the corporation on January 23, 2002. The secretary then received verbal
communication that the State of Utah was not interested in pursuing the matter any further, making this a mute issue. Said administrative action February 13, 2002 was taken after GSC elected
to dissolved.
22. On February 27, 2002, Appellee Hanks, acting as secretary of GSC, mailed Articles of Dissolution to the State Of Utah. However, due to the fact that the corporation had notified the
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State that the Corporation was insolvent and dissolved in January, 2002, the subsequent administrative dissolution becomes a mute issue, even though it was after the fact.
23. The Appellant's statement that: "On March 6, 2002, Appellee Hanks filed Articles of Incor
poration for a new corporation called Corporate Office Group (herein after "COG")", Ex.51&
52, is incorrect. The Appellee Douglas Hanks organized and filed paper for COG on or about
April 30, 1997. The Annual Report filed April 3, 2001 shows Douglas Hanks as the registered
agent and Secretary Treas. The Directors at that time were J C Hanks, Dilworth Strasser and
Douglas J. Hanks. The Directors held all of the ownership of COG. The Appellants statement
that: "Appellees Hanks and Zera Hunt were both listed as shareholders in COG (on the date of
incorporation) is incorrect, owning 35% and 5% of the shares respectively, is incorrect. The
statement that: "Dilworth Strasser was listed as the primary stockholder of COG owning 50% of
the shares", is incorrect on the date of filing for the corporation
24) The Appellants statement that: "Approximately one month prior to the incorporation of
COG, on the February 5, 2002, Appellees Albert Hunt and Douglas Hanks, acting as directors of
GSC, conveyed the four patented lode mining claims to COG for the nominal sum often
dollars", is incorrect because: 1) On February 5, 2002 the Appellee's Hunt and Hanks acting as
president and secretary of GSC conveyed the four patented claims to COG. 2) COG was
organized in 1997, more than four years previous to the transfer.
25

The Appellants statement that: "No evidence was ever presented that GSC owed any debts

or obligations to COG. No evidence was presented that COG paid anything other than nominal
consideration for the patented mining claims, is not correct. These issues were not a consideration
13

before the court. The Trial Court found in favor of the Appellee / Defendant/s. That being the
case then the Appellee assumed the right to orchestrate the transfer of ownership from GSC. The
issue that the patented claims were transferred into another company rather than to the Appellee
directly was not a consideration of the court, or to the stockholders of the dissolved GSC.
26

It would appear that the Appellants statements that: "There is no evidence that a proposal

was ever sent to the shareholders regarding the transfer of the mining claims to COG, and there
is no evidence that a vote was ever taken by the shareholders approving the transfer of the mining
claims to COG. Finally, no evidence was ever presented showing that the shareholders of GSC
had any knowledge whatsoever of the transfer of the mining claims to COG until a certain point
in these proceedings," are incorrect, redundant, after the fact, and has no bearing on the matter
before the Court. However! The Appellee notes that in the board of directors meeting held after
the shareholders meeting of January 23, 2002, the 2nd order of business was: That the Secretary
prepare and provide the necessary documentation to convey ownership of the five (5) patented
claims, then owned by Gold Stream Corporation, to Douglas J Hanks, or his assigns, as final and
complete payment for all monies owed by GSC to Doug]as J. Hanks, which including the obligation assumed by GSC regarding the tailing ponds fiasco, as provided in the Gold Stream minutes of April 2nd, 1989, and ratified again in the shareholders meeting held Oct. 16, 1990.
27) The Appellants Statement that:, "The record contains no evidence of an official appraisal of
the mining claims in connection with their attempted transfer." May be true, but the value of
the claims was never mentioned or became and issue in the matter before the Trial Court because
the "value possibilities" were known by most of the shareholders until the time when they be-
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came disillusioned and just wanted their money back, as evidenced in the proposed contract of
sale, as outlined in the shareholders meeting of October 1, 1989. In addition it might be well to
note that the Patented Claims were restored to the control of GSC with a payment of $5,000.00,
which was added to the $ 50,000.oo that had been expended by GSC for operations between the
time of the Contract foreclosure by GSC and before the Bankruptcy Trustee took the un-secured
claims as additional assets.
VII. APPELLEES SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Appellee notes the statement by the Appellant that "The findings of fact from the
trial court do not sufficiently support the trial court's conclusion that the transfer of the mining
claims was valid", is without merit. ((The Appellee here notes that before the trial was convened
only the Plaintiffs attorney was asked if one (1) day was sufficient for the trial. Plaintiffs attorney. Milt Harmon, responded "that it was". The Defendant / Appellee, Douglas Hanks, was not
asked,

but would not have known, based on his in-experience with court procedure and pro-

tocol. Time for the trial ran out at the end of the day, resulting in the fact that the Court was unable to hear the testimony of all the defendants witnesses and the consideration of the exhibits
during testimony. However when the Judge stopped the trial both Plaintiff & Defendant elected
not to give a closing argument after the Court offered them an opportunity to provide a "Proposed Findings and Judgment". Plaintiff & Defendant both agreed. The Court then requested that
the Defendant/Appellee provide the court with their unseen and un-used exhibits)). The statement
that: "The Court merely concluded that the transaction was valid without drawing any connection
to its factual findings", Is without foundation. The statement that: "Furthermore, the trial court
entirely omitted any reference to the value of the mining claims," was not an issue before the

15

Court, "other creditors", the other accepted creditors had vacated their claims against GSC in
favor of the Judgment, "the selection of the Board of Directors", The election of the Roard of
directors was done according to the Corp Articles, and as had been done for at least 42 years.)
and was the same as when the Appellant was elected as a director on October 14, 1994 for the
second time. Appellee disagrees with Appellants allegation that: "and the basis of Appellee
Hunt's alleged priority right", are nothing more than "alleged" and are unfounded. The trial
court dismissed the allegation.
The Appellants Statement on his pg 11, par. 2 That: "the findings of fact do support Appellant Hunt's grounds for judicial dissolution", is incorrect. Review of the Court transcript and
exhibits provided by the Appellees show that the findings of facts do not include evidence of
illegal or unethical actions taken by the Appellee's, nor the misapplication of the mining claims.
The statement that: "The Trial Court failed to show that the findings of fact represented the
sentiment of the trial court in regards to its conclusions" is incorrect. The findings of fact did
represented the sentiment of the trial court. The Appellants Statement that: "After noting the
unavailability of the corporate documents critical to the proof of the Appellant's case, and acknowledging Appellees' culpability in the unavailability of the documents, the trial court acted on
a presumption in favor of the Appellee by finding that "Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of
proof ", is incorrect because, 1) Appellee states that he has provided the Appellant and his
group of "friends" access to the corporate records on at least two other occasions prior to the
events of the Trial Court on April 6, 2004. 2) The corporate records were made available at a
meeting called for June 17,2003, (in which the Appellant Hunt refused to attend), which was
required by the court, and again a subsequent meeting wherein he was able to copy any and all
16

corporate records provided by the Appellee Hanks. 3): The Appellee received the records from
the previous secretary, (Mr. Fellows) who received them from the previous secretary (Mr. Mitchell) who received them from the previous secretary (Mr. Hardy) who received them from the
previous secretary who was the Appellant, Melvin Hunt, who acknowledges that he did not turn
over all of the corporate records that he had when he was replaced as the secretary, (as noted in
the Appellants Brief page 7, paragraph #10. which says in part,) "borrowed from the Appellant
Melvin J. Hunt and his father, Wilford Hunt, all of the corporate documents that they had in their
possession, including the records that Appellant, Melvin J. Hunt had maintained as company
Secretary." With the involvement of so many officers and secretaries over the last 40 plus years
how can the Appellant allege that the Appellee Albert E. Hunt "Borrowed and didn't return" certain records?)
Referring to the last paragraph on page 11 of the Appellant's Brief, The lower court did
not err when as a matter of law it concluded that the patented mining claims should be awarded to the Appellee. Appellee Hanks received ownership of the mining claims on January 23,
2002, by a majority of the shares outstanding as settlement for an obligation to Appellee Hanks
and / or his assigns. At the subsequent meeting of the board of directors the board voted by a
unanimous vote to implement the vote of the shareholders and directed the Secretary to prepare
and provide the necessary documentation for the transfer of the Patented claims and the dissolution. This was done along with a letter to all of the shareholders advising them as to what had
been done. Hanks and Hunt as President & Secretary and as agents for GSC, signed a QUIT
CLAIM DEED dated February 5, 2002 which was recorded in Madison County February 20,
2002. The court properly concluded that the transaction was proper after consideration of the
evidence and testimony provided. FURTHER: Appellant's statement that: "Therefore, Appel17

lee Hanks improperly transferred the mining claims to himself without board or shareholders
approval", is incorrect because: 1) The claims were not transferred to Hanks. The Patented
claims were transferred to COG. 2) The shareholders voted for the transfer. 3) The ownership
of the Patented claims was terminated when the Quit Claim Deed was signed by the President
and Secretary of GSC and subsequently recorded in Montana. Appellant's statements on his
page 12, par 2 that:, "Furthermore, Appellee Hanks' orchestration of the conveyance of the
claims to COG was not lawful. Documents submitted to the court indicate that GSC transferred
the mining claims to COG after the mining claims had allegedly been transferred to Appellee
Hanks. If GSC on longer owned the claims, it had no right to convey them. Therefore, the attempted conveyance of the mining claims to COG is tacit admission that the conveyance to
Appellee Hanks was invalid"., are not correct because: 1) There was no testimony given or
documents submitted to the trial court concerning conveyance of the claims. 2) This issue has
no bearing on the matter before the Court, which is "COMPLAINT AND DISSOLUTION OF
A UTAH COROIPORATION". Therefore it would appear to be of no concern to the Court.
3) The mining claims were never transferred to the Appellee Hanks. 4) The claims had to be
transferred to someone or some entity. Who received the claims was at the election of the Appellee Hanks. The Appellants statement, pg. 12, par 2, line 4, that: "Therefore, the attempted conveyance of the mining claims to COG is tacit admission that the conveyance to Appellee Hanks
was invalid", appears to be a contradictory and fallacious statement and is incorrect because:
1) the Appellee exercised the option provided in the board meeting minutes of January 23, 2002
to convey the Patented mining claims to Douglas Hanks or his assigns. 2) Appellee maintains
that the conveyance from GSC to COG complied with Utah Code. 3) The Appellee elected to
execute the transfer of ownership directly to a Corporation that was organized in 1997. The
documentation and transfer was completed as quickly as possible including the above men18

tioned "Deed" which was recorded in Madison Montana on Febraury 20, 2002. 4) Therefore
the conveyance of the mining claims to COG was valid. 5) The appellant acted in his capacity as Secretary of GSC and, at the request of the president, the conductor of the meeting
held January 17th & 23rd. 6) The Appellee, as Secretary Treasure, director, and as the meeting conductor was responsible for the orchestration of transfer after he understood the mind
and will of the shareholders and directors of GSC. However! the Appellee prays that the court
will consider the fact that once the ownership was transferred way from GSC, the method or
vehicle used as the recipient for that transfer is of no interest or concern to the Court If the
foregoing statement by the Appellee is true then the following statement and allegation by the
Appellant found on his pg 12, Par 3 grossly mi-represents the actions or intent of the Appellees because: 7) Once the transfer was authorized the method of transfer, to, what, or who,
was of no concern to the court or the shareholders. 8) The allegation that: "the transfer was
hidden from the shareholders" is wrong since the method of transfer, to, what, or who, was of
no concern to the court or the shareholders. 9) The mechanics of transfer were never a perogative of the shareholders, or of interest to the court. 10) Since there was no basis for interest by
the court or the shareholders concerning the method or mechanics of transfer, the statement on
his pg 12, par. 3 is redundant and becomes a mute issue. The statement made by the Appellant
found on his pg 12, Par 4 is not correct because: 1) The Appellee did not have a personal or
financial interest in GSC. 2) He was a director and Secretary Treasure. That's all. 3) Hanks
had no stock in GSC. 4) The statement that three of the five directors were major shareholders
of COG is not correct. Soon after the transfer- Corp Office Group, Inc.fCOG) held a shareholders and board meeting in January 2002, for the purpose of a reorganization and a change
of ownership. Therefore:. Appellants statement found on pg 12, par 5 is incorrect because:
1) The Appellee Hanks did not have a personal interest beyond the fact that he was a bonified,
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legal, legitimate creditor. 2) Appellee did sign the Quit Claim Deed as Secretary of GSC along
with the president, as was required. 3) There was an obligation owed by GSC to the Appellee
Hanks as the only remaining legitimate creditor of GSC, all other legitimate claimants having
vacated their position, as is evidenced by their vote for the transfer. 4) It is only proper and
reasonable that Appellee Hanks would take the necessary steps to protect his position as a
legitimate creditor. 5) The fact that Hanks chose to transfer the claims to a legitimate third party,
that being COG, is not an issue before the court.
The statements by the Appellant on his pg 13 par 2 are not correct because: 1) The trial
court found correctly that the Appellant, Melvin Hunt, "had not perfected his claim". 2) The records and the minutes of GSC support that decision. 3) There has been much speculation as to
the value of "all of the un-panted claims ", as well as the four patented claims. 4) At one time
the total number of claims, including the four patented claims, exceeded 120 claims. 5) The speculation has varied from zero (0) to 40 millions of dollars. 6) The Federal Bankruptcy Trustee's,
in the case of Holker and H & H Gold, held that the four Patented Mining Claims, along with the
other machinery and equipment, were asset to be liquidated. 7) When the Trustee's learned of
the obligation, ($ 50,000.00 plus) due and payable to GSC as a result of the work, money and
development that had been expended on the property before they attached the claims, they
decided to accept an offer of $ 5,000.00 to release the claims back to GSC rather than to try and
develop their asset position. 8) It would appear that the transaction with the "Trustee's" may be
an indication as to what the Federal Bankruptcy Court felt the property may be worth. 9) "one
obligation, ($24,675.00 plus interest), owed to the Appellee, Hanks, was over $ 50,000.00.
10) Who was to say what the four claims were worth without the other claims around them.
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11) The Patented Mining claims were provided to one legitimate creditor after any other re
cognized legitimate creditors had vacated their claim position.
The statements by the Appellant on his pg 13 par 3 are not correct because: 1) The Transaction did follow Utah Law and did not violate any Utah Statutes. 2) It is true that a formal
audit has never been requested by any of the shareholders or the corporation. Since GSC has
been insolvent for years there was never sufficient funds to do something that had not been
requested. 3) The GSC records including the check register have always been available to any
legitimate inquiry during business hours upon request. 4) However, since some records may
have been lost GSC has insisted that any examination be monitored by a corporate officer.
5) The 4 Patented claims were transferred after the ownership was relinquished thru the Motion
process and voted on by a large percentage of the shares outstanding at the time of the shareholders meeting of January 23, 2002. Therefore: The conveyance should not be reversed.

VIII. APPELLEE'S ARGUMENT
A.

The trial court's findings of fact do in fact support its conclusions of law.
1 Referring to Appellants statement on his page 14, par 1 The case before the Court should

not be reversed base on a mistake made through a mis-understanding by the inexperienced Appellee when he filed a Motion For Summary Disposition attacking what he thought was "Manifest error" on the part of the Appellant. The Appellee was wrong and apologizes for this error
and prays the Court will set it aside and judge the case before it based on the merits. The trial
court's findings of fact do support the conclusion that GSC properly transferred the mining
claims to Appellee Hanks. The findings show that conveyance followed the proper and legal
procedures as required in Article IX c, par 3 of the GSC Articles of Incorporation, wherein the
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shareholders and directors are "authorized to sell or otherwise dispose of any part or all of the
assets of the corporation." The Appellee agrees with the trial courts findings and suggests that
the findings did clearly indicate the"mind of the court" and resolve all issues of material fact
necessary to justify the conclusions of law and the judgment entered thereon".
Referring to Appellants statement on his page 15, par 1: "The trial transcript and the GSC
records did not consider the issue of interest by the Appellee. The Appellee had no interest as a
shareholder in the GSC, but he did signed the GSC Quit Claim Deed, for the four patented claims,
along with the president, as Secretary of GSC, as required. The record shows that he did have an
interest in the money owed to him as a legitimate creditor. The record shows that the requirements
of "Utah Case law, Fan v. Brinkerhoff' which held that to properly transfer substantially all of a
corporation's assets the board of directors must propose and the shareholders must approve of the
transfer" were complied with..
Referring to Appellants statement on his page 15, par 2 "In summary, the trial court found
that: 1) Gold Stream Corporation ("GSC") was Incorporated as documented in the Articles of
Incorporation, the Stockholder's Agreement and the alluded to Compensation Agreement". Said
agreement was never shown or recognized other than the Appellant's claim that such a document
did exist. GSC was a closed corporation with stated limitations on the first shares issued. The Corporation was authorized to issue 45,000 shares, The GSC records show that each of the five orignal incorporators received one-tenth, or 4,500 shares, (not 9,000) the rest were retained as treasury
shares and were later sold or provided to individuals as compensation. Referring to pg 15, par 3,
line 6, GSC operated a mining property in the state of Montana, with many of the originators
contributing time effort and money to establish the new corporation, which was incorporated in the
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State of Utah. June 28,1963 as the Gold Stream Corporation. In the early years the Appellant Melvin J. Hunt, was one of many persons helping to conduct mining operations. The five shareholders
met together, but there are not many records besides the Articles of Incorporation and the Shareholders Agreement. The first "Minutes" in the corporate files for GSC were taken in 1966. The
original officers were Albert E. Hunt as President, Melvin J. Hunt as Secretary. The Appellant
claims or states that in 1966 the Appellee, Albert E. Hunt, as President secured stock certificate
forms "which were filled out, signed, and delivered to each of the five original shareholders. The
Appellant claims (in-correctly) "that each of the certificates were for 9,000 shares". GSC records
show that of the original cancelled certificates available, at least two of the original five certificates
show 4,500 shares each, and were dated June 25, 1966. The stock ledgers at that time and the updated ledger support the conclusion that the original certificates were for 4,500 shares. Albert E.
Hunt, as President of the corporation normally exercised his position as well as he could. The Appellant has alleged that: "The President borrowed corporate records (which should have been
turned over to the new secretary) from himself (Melvin Hunt) and his father (Wilford Hunt) includeing a "Compensation Agreement" Corporate records do not support this allegation. Further:
when all of the shares were called in at the time of the "Split" (1976) the Appellant surrendered his
certificate/s, along with everyone else, which suggests that the previous allegation was without
merit and was unfounded. The corporation tried to continued its operations, and solicited help and
involvement from the PALL Foundation, and subsequently from the Brigham Young University.
Although it was planned and approved that the authorized stock be doubled, and ail-though the
minutes show in many places that ownership was transferred to the Pall Foundation and subsequently to the Brigham Young University, there are no cancelled or undelivered Stock Certificates
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in the Corporate files, nor is there any note in any ledger that stock was actually cut or issued, nor
is there any record that the stock position was doubled at that time. The appellant states that: " That
in spite of the Finding of Fact 7, in which the trial court explicitly acknowledged Appellee Albert E.
Hunt's responsibility for the unavailability of critical corporate records," is incorrect. There was no
testimony given to the court which would support this allegation. In the best of circumstances the
only allegation that could be considered by the court was an allegation the Appellant made about
something that was supposed to have happened more than thirty five years ago, and cannot be
substantiated by any documentation or corroborated by anyone else. The statement made by the
Appellant on pg 17, par 2 that: "Furthermore, the trial court failed to make the findings essential to
support its conclusions. The trial Court did not agree The statement made by the Appellant line 2,
that: "Among other omissions, the trial court failed to find that Appellee Hanks was a creditor of
GSC, certainly isn't correct. GSC records and exhibits provided to the Court contradict this
statement. The statement made by the Appellant, that :"The court made no findings regarding
other potential creditors of GSC with the exception of Appellant, whom the court recognized in
its findings but ignored in its conclusion, is correct because: The court found that the Appellant
had "failed to meet its burden of proof " as a legitimate creditor. All legitimate creditors having
vacated their claims. Further: GSC records and the exhibits provided to the Court show this statement to be unsubstantiated and without merit. The statement made by the Appellant that: "The
Court did not address the totality of corporate debt or priority among creditors", is incorrect.
GSC records and the exhibits provided to the Court show this statement to be without merit and
unsubstantiated. The legitimate creditors of record vacated their claims when they, as shareholders, voted to transfer the Patented Claims to the Appellee Douglas Hanks. The statement made
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by the Appellant that, "The court failed to rebut the presumption that since the recognized debt
to Appellant pre-dated the un-recognized debt to Appellee Hanks, Appellant's debt had priority",
is not correct because. GSC records and the exhibits provided to the Court shows that this statement is without merit and is un-substantiated.
Referring to Appellants statement on his page 17, par 2, line 8 : "Furthermore, the trial made
no findings as to the value of the four patented claims, whether this value exceed the corporate
debt, and how any excess value should be distributed among the shareholders. This statement
was not an issue before the Court.
Referring to Appellants statement on his page 17, par 2 "The court's sole finding regarding
the shareholder's percentage ownership in GSC was that each shareholder received an initial
distribution of 9,000 shares/' is incorrect. The available certificates from that initial issue show
that they each received 4500 shares, with the balance being retained as Treasury Shares, which
were later sold for operating funds, or distributed as compensation. The statement that:"Each of
the five original shareholders had equal shares of stock," IS TRUE, but that situation changed
every time there was a distribution of Treasury shares to any one of those five, or to a new stockholder. The percent of ownership changed every time stock was distributed from Treasury shares.
The Appellants continued statement, line 2, that: "thus, the findings of fact can support no other
conclusion than that the shareholders had equal stock in the company" is incorrect and does not
account for the later sale and distribution of Treasury Stock, which indirectly supports the court's
conclusion that the shares were properly transferred", FURTHER: The treasury shares were sold
to cover the cost of continued operation, or were issued as compensation for monies and services
rendered, as was authorized in the Articles of Incorporation and the minutes of several share25

holder and board meetings. Referring to Appellants statement on his page 17, par 3, line 5,
The allegation that Appellee "Hanks" owned a substantial majority of the corporate shares",
is probably a typographical error, [which probably should have said,] "Appellee HUNT",
meaning Albert E. Hunt, who owned more that 50% of the outstanding shares, and has for some
years. Albert E. Hunt was able to buy corporate shares when they were made available. Most of
those same shares were offered to other stockholders, but they declined. The Appellee Albert E.
Hunt purchased the shares of his brothers, Wilford Hunt and Milt Hunt, along with other shares
which are recorded in the corporate stock ledger. Some of those shares were issued because of
money, time and services rendered by him in behalf of GSC. Referring also to Appellants statement on his page 17, par 3 "and ramrodding the transfer to himself of $ 1,1 50,000 of corporate
assets in payment for an alleged $24,675 debt", is grossly in-accurate because: 1) When it refers
to the "ramrodding" the Appellant is probably referring to the Appellee Hanks, not Hunt. However it should be noted that neither Hunt or Hanks did any ramrodding. "Nevertheless, one
searches the trial court's findings in vain for any mention of a final distribution of shares" is at
best a curious statement which suggest that the Appellant recognizes that there were Treasury
shares after the initial issue of stock, "a contested issue of material fact essential to any determination of the propriety of the mining claim transfer. "The Appellee refers the Court and Appellant to Ex 1, page 3, Par.l. The Appellant's first statement on pg 18 of his Brief states that: "The
court's finding additionally omitted the legality of the final Board member selection, which also
turns on the distribution of shares and is critical to the validity of the conveyance of the claims to
Appellee Hanks. This issue was not a consideration of the trial court. However the Appellee
notes that the Appellant was elected and the Appellant agreed to serve as a director and attended
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than 50% of the outstanding shares of GSC. The Appellee also notes that the elections of the
reconvened meeting of January 23, 2002 were in compliance with the requirements of the Articles of Incorporation, and followed the same basic procedure as in the previous 35 years.
The Appellants statement on his pg 18, Par 2 that: "Ultimately, the trial court did not make a
single finding in support of the transfer yet still ruled that it was proper. (R. 358 ~ 10," is incorrect because:!) The court did recognize that GSC paid the obligation due the Appellee Hanks
as a legitimate creditor. 2) The trial court did recognize the Articles Of Incorporation and thus
accepted a procedure for transferring corporate assets. 3) The procedure holds that a majority of
the outstanding share voted may approve of any transfer of corporate assets. 4) GSC complied
with that requirement.
The Appellee Hanks suggests that the whole proceeding of the matter before the Court comes
down to the issue of "Stock ownership".(Please refer to page 36 of this Brief) The shareholders of record own the shares as stated on their certificates and as recorded in the stock
ledger. That being true then what the officers and directors of the former Gold Stream Corporation did was legal and appropriate. Further: The ownership of the Patented claims by GSC ended
when the Shareholders voted to provide the four Patented claims to the Appellee Hanks. How,
or to who, the transfer was accomplished was not an issue, and is of no interest to the Court.
Subsequent statements or questions about said transfer were not an issue and are of no interest to
the Court. Further comments, question or allegations on that issue are not germane. The trial
court did not commit any legal error.
2.

The trial court's findings, after examination of testimony and exhibits, do not supPort Appellate Hunt's request for judicial dissolution.
The trial court's findings do not support the proposition that GSC should not be Judi-
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cially dissolved. Utah Code Annotated § 16-lOa-1430 establishes the grounds for judicial
dissolution. This Statute in the Utah Code does not apply to the issue before the Court because:
At a Share-holders meeting held January 17 & 23 , wherein 81.79% of the outstanding shares
were represented, the Shareholders voted by a large majority of the outstanding shares to dissolve the Corp. The statute, which states in part that: " (2) A corporation may be dissolved in a
proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that: (b) the directors or those in control of the
corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, op-pressive, or
fraudulent (d) the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted," The actions of the directors
or those in control of GSC did not meet the required criteria under this statute. Therefore: The
findings from the trial court do not support the Appellant Hunt's petition for the judicial
dissolution of GSC.
The Appellants first statement on page 19 of his brief states that: "The trial court's findings
support the suggestion that the directors of GSC were acting in an illegal or fraudulent manner.
First, the trial court found that as Appellee A. Hunt began to assume to control of GSC that he
took from Appellant and his father all of the corporate documents that they had, including their
stock certificates, and never returned them," is nothing more than an allegation that was not
supported by any documentation or testimony other than the Appellants. The Appellant never
provided any particulars concerning the supposed actions of the President, Albert E. Hunt, Such
as the date, year, or time of alleged incident. The Appellant never suggested a reason or justification for said action. If the Appellee Albert Hunt took their stock certificates then perhaps the
Appellant can explain the stock certificates that they turned into the corporation at the time of the
stock split. Further: Perhaps the Appellant can explain the stock certificate that was provided by
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Appellant's father, Wilford Hunt, to Appellee Albert E. Hunt, when Albert Hunt bought his
fathers stock position. The Allegation is inconsistent with the exhibits, testimony or facts in this
case. The Appellants statement on his pg 19, #7) that: "By withholding access to the records the
Appellee's successfully hid from Appellant the transfer of the mining claims to COG" begs the
question: What records is the Appellant referring to? The "after the fact" transfer was never an
issue or consideration of the trial court. The Appellant had access to all of the GSC records at the
meeting of the Appellant and Appellee on November 19, 2003.
The Appellants statement on his pg 19, Par 2 that: "Next, trial court's findings of fact effectively recognize that the Appellees mis-applied the mining claims in awarding them exclur
sively to Appellee Hanks in preference to Appellant and other creditors," Is incorrect because:
All other legitimate creditors vacated their claims against GSC in favor of awarding tfaePatented claims to the Appellee Douglas Hanks.
The Appellants statement that: "The trial court found that the compensation agreement
signed by the original shareholders was one of three documents that constituted the formation
of the corporation. (R. 359-360 f 1). The compensation agreement allowed the original Shareholders to be reimbursed for all money lent to the corporation," would appear to be nothing
more than "Hearsay". The Trial Court agreed that there has been no evidence or exhibits
showing a "Compensation Agreement" or that the original shareholders signed such a document.
: The Appellants statement on his pg 19, Par 3 that: "The trial court acknowledged Appellant's
personal work and other contributions to GSC when it found that Appellant in the early years of
GSC, was the primary person working and contributing the operation of the mines. (IL 359 f 4).
By acknowledging Appellant's contributions, for which he had never been paid, and by recognizing the Compensation Agreement the trial court effectively found Appellant to be a creditor
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ofGSC", is incorrect because: The corporation records suggests that the Appellant received
additional shares for services rendered as did others in the corporation, Ex. 15. The Appellants
allegations (par 3) that: "The court inherently recognized the State of Utah as a creditor of GSC
when it found that the corporation had suffered an administrative dissolution for non-payment
of taxes. (R. 258; Ex. 54). Conversely, the trial court failed to find that Appellee Hanks was a
creditor of GSC. Even if GSC did assume the $20,000 debt to Nupetco, Appellee was not the
only creditor of GSC and the application of the mining claims to him alone was a mis-application of corporate assets", is incorrect because: 1) the "administrative dissolution was after the
fact. The dissolution had already taken place, making this a mute issue and of no interest to the
court. 2) The court did find that Appellee Hanks was a legitimate creditor when it ruled that the
"Claims were properly transferred." 3) GSC assumed the obligation due and owing to Appellee Hanks as a consequence of the tailing ponds fiasco. 4) The Appellee Hanks was the only
remaining legitimate creditor, all others having vacated their interest or claim.
The Appellants statement on page 20 of his Brief that:
"B. The trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that GSC properly
transferred the mining claims because the Appellees did not follow proper
procedure and engaged in self-dealing,"
is incorrect because: 1) The corporation and its officers followed correct and proper procedures
in the Shareholders meeting, concluded on January 23, 2002, when it voted to transfer the Patented claims to the remaining legitimate creditor, after the other legitimate creditors had vacated
their claims against the corporation. The Appellee Hanks was only interested as a legitimate
creditor, and was not involved in self dealing.
The Appellants statement on pg 20, par 2 that: "Apellant's position that the trial court erred
as a matter of law rests on two common-sense principles supported by well-settled
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Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme Court authority. The first proposition is that the sale,
lease, exchange, or disposal of substantially all of a corporation's property is not proper unless
the board of directors proposes and the shareholders approve the transaction", suggests that the
Appellee's did not meet the requirements of this "proposition", when in fact they did, as the
Minutes of the January 23, 2002 show. The second principle is that the director who has an
interest in a transaction does not have the authority to bind the corporation," suggests that the
Appellee Hanks had a financial interest in the corporate decision to award the Patented claims
to himself when in fact that statement does not apply and is applied incorrectly since the Appellee was not a stockholder. His interest as a legitimate creditor was to see that he was compensated for the obligation due and payable.
The Appellants statement on pg 20, par 4 that "The impropriety of the sale of corporate
assets without shareholder approval, when it is required, is well established in Utah Law" Does
not apply to the matter before the Court since the requirement was complied with.
The Appellants statement that: "Additionally, Utah Supreme Court precedent establishes
the illegality of directors preferring the payment of debts in which they have a personal stake,
and the impropriety of director participation in transactions where the directors have a personal
interest". This Statute does not apply because: The Shareholders, directed the payment or transfer, not the directors. However, the Appellee ask the Court to consider the fact that the Appellee Hanks voted as a director, not as a shareholder, and to please note that all other directors
(consituting a quorum) were shareholders, owning more than 65% of the outstanding shares, and
They all voted to sustained the Motion. The Appellants statement on page 21 Par 1, of his Brief
that: "As a director of GSC, Appel lee Hanks preferred payment to himself. Furthermore, he not
only participated in, but initiated, orchestrated, and motivated, the transaction allegedly transfer-
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ring the mining claims to himself and to COG. Therefore, the trial court acted improperly when
it held that the conveyance of nearly all of GSC's remaining assets to Appellee Hanks was proproper," is incorrect. This issue has been answered in previous statements by the Appellee.
What the Appellee did with the Patented claims and how he did it was not an issue before the
Court. The Appellants statement on his page 21, par 2 that:
1. "The January 20,2002 vote to transfer the patented mining claims to Appellee Douglas Hanks should have been invalidated because GSC did not approve
the transfer",
is incorrect because: 1) To begin with the date is not correct. (January 23, 2002) 2) GSC did
approve the transfer "from". To whom, or to what was of no concern after it was voted on to
liquidate the asset. 3) This issue has been considered in previous pages of this Brief. Further
comment may he considered redundant. The Appellants statement on his page 21, par 3 that
"The trial court's ruling should not survive review because Appellee Hanks received the mining claims before the shareholders could vote on the matter. This Court has established that the
sale of substantially all of a corporate assets requires shareholders approval and that a "failure
to comply with statutory requirements renders the conveyance

invalid." Fan 829 I\2d

at 12 1; Utah Code Ann. § 16-lOa-1202(1), is not correct because: 1) GSC did comply with the
statutory requirements.
The Appellants statement on his page 21, par 4 that: "The Utah Court of Appeals held in Fan v.
Brinkerhoff that the conveyance of corporate assets must comply with statutory authority. Fan

829 P.2d at 120. To properly convey substantially all of a corporation's assets the corporation's
board of directors must (1) adopt a resolution recommending the conveyance, (2) provide a written or printed notice of the resolution to each shareholder entitled to vote, and (3) ensure that the
resolution is adopted by the shareholders. Fan at 120-121; I Mali Code Ann. § 16-1 Osi 1202(1),
32

does not apply. The action to liquidate the assets to satisfy a corporate obligation was done in a
Shareholders Meeting wherein 81% of the out-standing share were represented and a large majority voted for said action. The Board of Directors and officers implemented the directive of
that vote. This response is a repeat of what has already been stated and may also be considered
redundant. It should be noted that in "Fan v. Brinkerhoff, the president of EEB, a corporation,
transferred out the corporations only asset and sold it to a creditor in order to satisfy a personal
debt." In this case the Patented claims were awarded to satisfy a corporate obligation after a
shareholders vote to do so.
The Appellants statement on his page 22, par 3 that: "Moreover, the trial court erred when it
failed to invalidate the transfer because the conveyance of the corporate assets to Appellee Hanks
was not approved by GSC shareholders. The GSC articles of incorporation state that the assets of
the corporation "cannot" be sold or disposed of unless the majority of the shares approve the
trans-action. Ex. 22 p. 7. In the present case Appellee Hanks has not provided the court with any
evidence that prior to January 20, 2002, the shareholders voted to transfer the mining claims to
him. Appellee Hanks' motion at the January 23 stockholders meeting to vote on the transfer was
nothing more than an attempt to receive post hoc approval for a transfer he knew to be invalid.
Ex. 4 p. 4. Because neither the board of directors nor the shareholders approved the January 20,
2002 transfer the trial court erred when it found that the mining claims had been properly
transferred to Appellee Hanks." is incorrect because: 1) The share holders did vote to for the
conveyance. 2) The reference to the articles of incorporation is incorrect.. The articles do not
say "cannot" 3) As has been noted before, the transfer, as a result of the Shareholders Meeting
of January 23, 2003, was correct. 4) The transfer occurred after the shareholders meeting of
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January 23, 2002. 5) The spurious statement that there was no evidence shown before January
20, 2002 is irrelevant to the case before the court because: The transfer was after the January
23 rd , 2002 meeting. The Appellants statement on his page 25, par. 2 that:
2.The January 23, 2002 vote to transfer the mining claims should have been
invalidated because Appellate Hanks engaged in self-dealing.
The trial court erred because it failed to hold that Appellee Hanks' participation in the satisfaction of a debt owed to him by GSC invalidated the conveyance of the mining claims. The Utah
Supreme Court has said that when officers of a corporation "deal with the corporation in their
own interests that as to them the contract is void. Such a contract is void because "any director
who has an interest in a proposed transaction with the corporation cannot participate in such
business to bind the corporation, either to make up the quorum or to vote on the proposal," Id,
does not apply in the matter before the court because: 1) The Appellee was not a shareholder,
and had no "interest." 2) The shareholders voted on the motion, not the directors. 3) There was a
quorum of over 81% of the outstanding shares. 73% voted for the motion. 4): The transfer was
accomplished to satisfy an obligation due to a legitimate creditor, not because of self-dealing by
a director.
The Appellants statement on his page 24, par. 2 that: Here, Appellee Hanks' participation
voided the conveyance because he was the driving force behind the conveyance of the patented
mining claims. Appellee Hanks not only made the motion to transfer the mining claims to himself but he also orchestrated an election for a new board of directors, successfully adding to the
GSC board Dilworth Strasser and Appellee Z. Hunt, both leading shareholders in (COG. the
eventual attempted transferee of the mining claims," is incorrect because: 1) The Appellee had
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been asked to conduct Board meetings and shareholder meetings for years, including meetings attended by the Appellant Melvin Hunt both as a shareholder and as a Director. 2) The Appellant is in
error when he states that the Appellee successfully adding to the GSC board Dilworth Strasser and
Appellee Z. Hunt" both of whom had been directors for years, Ex 4, pg 3, Par 2, wherein Hanks
and Strasser note their intention to resign as directors. The Appellants statement in that same
paragraph that: "Strasser & Hunt were "both leading shareholders in COG", is incorrect. Zera
Hunt became a director in COG after the shareholders meeting of January 23, 2005.
The Appellants statement on his page 24, par. 3 that: "The trial court erred in recognizing
the transfer as valid because Appellee Hanks was Secretary of GSC when he made the motion
to transfer. Id. As a director with an interest in the transaction Appellee Hanks could not legally
participate, yet he made the proposal that he receive the mining claims. Appellee Hanks should
have abstained from the motion and the vote to convey the mining claims to himself, just as he
abstained when GSC voted to assume his debt to Nupetco. Ex. 7. Because he was an interested
party his motion was improper and the vote invalid", is not correct because: 1) The Appellee
conducted the meeting as Secretary. 2) He made the motion and voted as a director. The fact
that he did not abstain is not relevant. 3) The Appellee had no interest in the GSC transaction.
4) The Appellee was not a stockholder. 5) He was a legitimate, recognized creditor.
The Appellants statement on his page 24, par. 4 that: "Additionally, Appellee Hanks Provided no evidence that he ever received possession of the mining claims subsequent to the shareholder vote. The record does show however that on February 5, 2002, GSC transferred the mining claims to a different entity, COG. By failing to transfer the mining claims to Appellee Hanks
the GSC board of directors effectively declared the transfer of the mining claims to him was not
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valid. February 5, 2002 transfer of the mining claims to COG was a further admission that the
transfer to Appellee Hanks was invalid", is incorrect, is not a valid argument and is not an issue
before the court and is not relevant. The Appellants statement, his page 25, par. Marked .3: that:
3,

"The February 5, 2002 transfer of the mining claims to COG was invalid under
Utah Code Ann. § 16-lOa-704 because GSC shareholders did not approve it
and the Appellee's again engaged in self-dealing,"

Does not apply. A meeting was held wherein the Appellant was present and voted on the "Motion". The Appellee Hanks, as a legitimate creditor, had no vested interest in GSC, was
not a shareholder, and did not engage in self-dealing. The Appellants statement on his page 25
par. 4 that: "Without a finding of fact on the percentage ownership of shares, it is impossible to
determine the number and identity of "the holders of outstanding shares having not less than the
minimum number of votes" necessary to authorize the action. The history of share ownership
subsequent to the initial distribution of 9,000 shares to each stockholder is one of the most hotly
contested issues in this action", IS INCORRECT. IT IS THE APPELLEE'S OPINION THAT
THE PREVIOUS STATEMENT ABOVE IS PERHAPS THE MOST INCORRECT STATEMENT CONTAINED IN THE APPELLANTS BRIEF BECAUSE: (emphasis added) If incorrect, then the whole argument for the Appellants appeal is unfounded and unsubstantiated because 1) At the shareholders meeting of June 19, 1976 (29 years ago) 86.9% of the outstanding shares were represented in person, or by proxy, as follows: Ex 18.
Albert E. Hunt

7,312 shares

Milton Z.Hunt
7,313
"
Wilford E. Hunt
5,850
"
Melvin E. Hunt
5,850
"
Sherald James
5,850
"
Arlon Jacobs
6,966
"
Total 39,141 shares or 86.98%
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2) All of the original share positions combined now exceeded the original issue of 22,500
shares. (4500 each). 3) Shares in excess of 22,500 had been issued from treasury stock.
4) The presence of Arlon Jacobs at that meeting shows that treasury shares were being issued
and accepted by all of the original five incorporators and shareholders. 5) The corporate stock
ledger did not show any certificates for 9,000 shares at that time or any time previous. 6) All
of the original incorporators, and their stocks, were present or represented by proxy at that meeting. 7) At that meeting all of the original five stock positions were for less than 9,000 shares, as
was claimed by the Appellant. 8) Had there been any question about "stock position" it should
have surfaced at least by that time, or sometime previous to 1976. 9) The Appellants acceptance
of (a) the shareholders of record, (more than five), (b) the minutes of the meeting, ex 18 (c) The
resolution for the stock split (d) the issuance of gift shares, (29 years ago) makes the Appellants
appeal unfounded and without merit. 10) The original shareholders all had additional shares which
were apparently issued for services rendered. 11) The vote was unanimous to support the ressolution for the stock split. 12) It was also approved at that meeting to issue gift shares to nine people
(including two of the original shareholders.) 13) All of the Share certificates were called in at the
time of the stock-split. 14) The certificates issued June 25, 1966, were for 4500 shares. Ex 14. The
Appellee notes that in the next Shareholders Meeting the Appellant signed the minutes wherein
the minutes of the meeting held June 19, 1976 were read and approved.
The Appellants statement on his page 25, par. 6 that: "This issue alone is sufficient to justify
a judicial dissolution in order to protect the other shareholders from the machinations of Appellee Hanks, who as secretary had control of the corporate records, and of other Appellees includeing Albert E. Hunt. Indeed, a judicial dissolution may be entirely justified by the trial court's
Finding of Fact 7 that "Albert F. Hunt, as President of the corporation and in his own personal
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capacity thereafter" began to assume control of the company" that he subsequently "borrowed"
from Appellant and Wilford Hunt all of the corporate documents that they had in their Possession, including the records that Melvin J. Hunt had maintained as corporate Secretary, their stock
certificates and particularly the agreement(compensation agreement,), " and that the documents
have never been returned, "Albert E. Hunt being unable to disclose their location." (R. 359-58
emphasis added). Whether or not Appellees maliciously took measures to conceal evidence
harmful to their claims, the very difficulty of resolving contested issues such as share ownership in the absence of that evidence calls for supervision by the court", is incorrect because:
1) The Appellants allegation that the Appellee Hanks acted beyond his responsibilities as secretary / treasure, and as a director is unfounded. 2) The Appellee Hanks was secretary of GSC
at the time of dissolution and still has all of the corporate records. 3) During the year of 1974
the Appellee Hanks received from a corporate officers all of the known records. 4) Since the
corporation has never had a business office the corporate records were deposited with the secretary, as was the case when the Appellant and others served as secretary. 5) The corporate
records and minutes show that care was given to the fact that GSC was a corporation and needed to behave as such. However! The allegation that the President may have acted beyond his
responsibility as president had some merit. There were time when the directors had to remind
the president that GSC was a corporation. 6) The Appellant's allegation that the president.
Appellee Albert Hunt "Borrowed" corporate records from the Appellant and his father is based
on "here-sav", and suggests that the time of the alleged incident was after the Appellant was
secretary, which raises the question as to why corporate records would be returned to a nonsecretary. FURTHER: The corporate records and minutes show that the Appellee, Albert Hunt,
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had the confidence and trust of the Appellant, (as was shown by the number of times that the Appellee Albert Hunt had or received the proxies of the Appellant Melvin Hunt), up until March
1998 when there was an issue over some claim documents. The Appellants statements on his
page 26, par. 2 that,: "it is uncontested, however, that GSC transferred the four patented mining claims to COG without a meeting, and without Section 16-10a-704(l) written consent. Section 16-10a-704(4) provides that a "shareholder action taken pursuant to this section is not effective unless all written consents on which the corporation relies for the taking of an action
pursuant to Subsection (I) are received by the corporation within a 60 day period." Therefore,
in the absence of any evidence of the written consents, the non-meeting transfer of the mining
claims to COG was and is invalid", are not correct statements because: The ownership of the
four patented claims changed when a majority of the shares outstanding voted to transfer the
stock to satisfy an obligation. How that transfer was accomplished, or the method used, is not
nor has been an issue before the Court.
The Appellants statements on his page 26, par. 3 that: "The February 5, 2002, transfer of
the mining claims from GSC to COG is further invalid because: 1) the transfer was made prior
to the incorporation of COG; 2) there is no evidence that the transfer ever received stockholder
approval; 3) the leading shareholders of COG were on the board of directors for GSC; and 4)
Appellee Hanks, despite his conflicts of interest, deeply involved himself in the transaction",
are incorrect because: 1) as was stated in a previous response, COG was organized as a corporation in the state of Utah April 30, 1997. Changes have been made as appropriate since that time.
2) How that transfer was accomplished is not, nor has been, an issue before the Court. 3) Zera
Hunt was not on the board of COG as alleged by the Appellant. 4) Appellee Hanks was in39

volved as a creditor, but as a non-shareholder he had no interest.
The Appellants statements on his page 27, par.l that: "Additionally, by failing to obtain
share-holder approval for the COG transfer Appellee Hanks again failed to comply with the
GSC Articles of Incorporation. In fact, Appellant only learned of this transfer after he received
answers to his interrogatories in the present case, this despite being present when the shareholders dissolved GSC", are incorrect because 1) the transfer was after the fact and was of no
concern to the court, or to the Appellant. 2) There was no need for the Appellant to know the
reason or method of transfer since it was not an issue before the Court. 3) Since the transfer to
COG was after the fact and is of no concern to the court, "when or how the Appellant learned of
the transfer" is a mute issue.
The Appellants statements on his page 27, par. 2 that: "Furthermore, there is no evidence to
suggest that the board of directors of GSC ever considered transferring the mining claims to
COG, nor is there any evidence to suggest that the GSC board of directors proposed to transfer
the mining claims to COG. But even if the GSC board of directors had approved the transfer to
COG they would have lacked the authority to bind GSC. Because three out of the five GSC
directors were also major shareholders in COG, the GSC board could not form a voting quorum
without engaging in self-dealing. Ex. 4 p. 4; Ex.57 p.2; see Davis 558 P.2 at 596 (holding that
directors who have an interest in a transaction cannot bind the corporation.), are incorrect because: 1) The Appellant is assuming, incorrectly, that the "directors" of GSC were responsible
for the vote to transfer the four patented claims. The shareholders were responsible for that
action. 2) The reason or method of transfer was of no concern to the Appellant. 3) The court
was not interested in weather or not the directors of GSC had evidence of a proposed transfer to
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COG. 4) However, The Board did have a quorum without the Appellee's vote for any issue
that may have come before the board at the time of dissolution. 5) The Appellee Zera Hunt had
nothing to do with COG when the shareholders voted for the transfer.
The Appellants statements on his page 27, par. 3 that: "Additionally, the Quit Claim Deed
transferring the mining claims was not binding because Appellee Hanks engaged in self-dealing.
Appellees Albert Hunt and Douglas Hanks signed the quit claim deed on the part of GSC to convey the patented mining claims to COG. Appellee Hanks had a personal interest in the transaction because he was the second leading shareholder in COG. As a partial owner of COG, Appellee Hanks did not have the authority to bind GSC in conveying the mining claims", are incorrect
because: 1) The Appellee Hanks was not involved in self-dealing and had no interest in the transfer transaction since he was not a shareholder. 2) The Appellees Hanks and Hunt signed, correctly, as President and Secretary of GSC. 3) The only interest of Appellee Hanks was as a legitimate creditor.
The Appellants statement on his page 27, par. 4 that: "The absence of shareholder approval,
the violation of section 16-10a-704, the impermissibility of the GSC board of directors' approval
of the transfer, and the Appellee Hanks' personal interest in the February 5 transaction nullified
the conveyance of the mining claims to COG", is incorrect because: 1) the duly required meetings were held, therefore section 16-10a-704 does not apply. 2) The Shareholders approved the
transfer. 3.) There was no need for director approval, particularly since all of the directors were
shareholders except the Appellee Hanks. 4) The directors, as implementers, directed the secretary to prepare and provide all of the necessary documentation: 1) For the transfer, 2) Then the
dissolution of GSC.
41

The Appellants statement on his page 28, par. 1 that: "The Utah Supreme Court has ruled
that a director of an insolvent corporation does not have the right to prefer the debt of a creditor
"where a director of the corporation was liable as indorser, guarantor, or surety." Walker Bros, at
98; See also W.P. Mercantile Co. v. Mt. Pleasant Co-op., 42 P. 869 (Utah 1895) (holding that
the bona fide debt of a director of a corporation may be paid in peference to the debt of another
creditor); Hogan v. Price River Irrigation Co., 184 P. 536, 542 (Utah 1919) (holding that directors are prohibited from preferring debts due to themselves)," does not apply because: 1) The
directors did not "prefer" Hanks. The shareholders voted to meet the obligation to the only recognized and legitmate creditor 2) Appellee Hanks was not liable as an indorser, guarantor, or
surety. 3) GSC was liable after accepting the obligation as owed to the Appellee, "(holding that
the bona fide debt of a director of a corporation may be paid in preference to the debt of another
creditor)" 4) refers to a private dept of a director being paid by a corporation, "(holding that
directors are prohibited from preferring debts due to themselves") 5) does not apply in the
present case because the shareholders voted for the transfer, not the directors. However: there
was a quorum of the directors without the vote of the Appellee Hanks. 6) The court recognized
the Appellee as the only legitimate creditor, all others having vacated their interest or claims.
The Appellants statement on his page 28, par.3 that:
C. The trial court erred in approving the transfer because the value of the mining claims
the amount owed to Appellee", is in error because: 1) The Bankruptcy Trustee, prior to
to his acceptance of $ 5,000.00 from GSC, held that that as Trustee for the Bankrupcy of H & H
Gold, he was not prepared to pay GSC for the development funds, exceeding $ 50,000.00, which
were expended by GSC prior to his attaching the claims as assets. Rather than do so the Trustee
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accepted $ 5,000.00 from GSC and returned the patented mining claims back to the control of
GSC. 2) It would appear that the Trustee was not prepared to establish any value of the claims
over and above the $50,000.oo that would have to be paid to GSC to pursue the matter. 3) In the
Agenda provided to the shareholders of the shareholders meeting held April 6,1995, (Ex. 45,
Pg 1, the president noted that the corporation was insolvent with obligations in excess of One
Hundred Thousand dollars. With the exception of the obligation due the Appellee Hanks most
of the remaining claims were vacated in favor of the transfer to the Appellee Hanks. As reported previously, there have been other estimates as to the value of the whole property, not just the
four Patented claims.
The Appellants statements on his page 28, par.3 con't that: " The trial court erred in it(s)
decision because Appellee Hanks acted contrary to Utah law by orchestrating the transfer of a
corporate asset of greater value than the debt owed. A director of a corporation cannot prefer
himself in the payment of a corporate debt insofar as the payment exceeds the pro rata share
of that which was properly payable. Walker Bros. 262 P. at 98. In Walker Bros. v. Eastern
Motors Co., the president of an insolvent corporation sold five cars and applied the sum of the
sale to a bank note for which he was the indorser. Id. at 98-99. The Utah Supreme Court. Held
that the action was illegal insofar as the payment exceeded the pro rata share which was properly payable. ID. at 99" are incorrect because: 1) The shareholders made the decision. 2) It has
not been established that the Patented claims had a value exceeding the corporate obligations
in access of $ 100,000.00. 2) in the case of Walker Bros.vs.Eastern Motors it would appear
that the president sold five corporate vehicles and applied the sum to an obligation for which
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he was responsible. That was not the situation in the present case.
The Appellants statements on his page 28, par. 5 that: "In the current case there is Evidence that GSC had approved a dept owed to Appellee Hanks of $24,675 plus interest. Ex. 9.
It is, however undisputed the GSC owed money to other GSC shareholders and to the State
of Utah for unpaid taxes. The assets available to GSC for the payment of debts consisted primarily of the mining claims. Ex. 4 p. 1. The mining claims were not appraised at the time of
the trial, however at the September 1, 1989, GSC annual shareholders meeting Appellee Hanks
proposed the assets of the corporation, consisting of the mining claims, be sold or leased for
not less than $1,150,000.00. Ex.1 p. 3. Therefore, the value of the mining claims, far exceed
the amount due to Appellee Hanks and should have been distributed on a pro rata basis among
various GSG creditors including Appellant and the State of Utah, as Appellee Hanks was well
aware. Nevertheless GSC, at Appellee Hanks' instigation, preferred his debt, as a GSC director, above those of others. Furthermore, the value of the assets far exceed the amount of the
debt. Accordingly, the trial court erred and its ruling should be overturned", are incorrect because. 1) the shareholders voted to pay the debt. 2) Hanks suggesting a sales price does not
establish a value. 2) The Appellants allegation that the four patented claims were the primary
assets is erroneous. 3 The Appellant was well aware that at the time of the intended sale of the
assets of GSC in 1989 there were more than 110 claims, in addition to the patented claims, that
were part of the contract with H & H Gold 4) The company that held the contract (H & H Gold)
went broke and could not continue operations, resulting in a Bankruptcy. 5) It would appear
that the Appellee, who was not a mining engineer or geologist, may have been wrong in his
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estimate of the value of all the claims, not just the Patented claims. 6) It was in the best interest
of the shareholders of GSC to get the best price possible for all of the claims. 7) It would appear
that any value of the property will only be established after extensive data has been provided as a
result of extensive testing. 8) The corporate records and the minutes of corporate meetings show
that the Court was right in its findings, "that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof to establish its claim set forth in the Complaint filed herein".
D.

GSC's dissolution, including the transfer of the four patented mining claims to
Appellee Hanks, violated Utah dissolution statutes and this matter should be
remanded for judicial dissolution.

The Appellants statements on his page 29, par. 3 that: "During the January 23, 2002, meeting
Appellee Hanks moved that GSC be dissolved. Appellee Zera Hunt seconded the motion,
which passed by shareholder vote. Utah Code Ann 16-lOa-1402 authorizes the dissolution of
a corporation after the issuance of shares. Section 1402(2) requires that 'the board of directors
must recommend dissolution to the shareholders unless the board of directors determines that
because of a conflict of interest or other special circumstances, it should make no commendation and communicates the basis for its determination to the share-holders,"(Emphasis added).
Thus, under the statute, the board of directors must assess any personal conflict of interest ami
disclose it to the shareholders before recommending dissolution. Board members subject to such
a conflict or circumstances may not recommend dissolution to the shareholders", does not apply
because: 1) The board of directors did notify the Shareholders of the "Intent to dissolve" in its
Agenda (notice) sent to all the shareholders of record 2) With a quorum of directors present at
the Shareholders Meeting of January 23, (a quorum without Hanks) and there being a large majority of shares represented at said meeting (81%), the shareholders recommended that the cor45

poration be dissolved after the liquidation of assets. 3) There was no personal conflict of interest
to be disclosed since the Appellee Hanks was not a shareholder.
The Appellants statements on his page 30, par. 2 that: "Appellee Hanks'conflict of interest
is beyond dispute. He had orchestrated circumstances so that upon dissolution of GSC he stood
to receive the entire corporate assets which he himself had recommended not be leased or sold
for less than $1,150,000. Ex. 1. p.3. Therefore, under Utah statute, Appellee Hanks had no authority to even recommend, much less propose, the dissolution. Consequently, the dissolution and
all associated transactions, most notably the transfer of the mining claims, were invalid. See Farr
892 P.2d at 121 ("failure to comply with statutory requirements renders the conveyance invalid."), are incorrect because. 1) There was no conflict of interest. Hanks was not a share,
holder. His sole interest has been the satisfaction of the obligation owed to him, preferably in
cash. 2) The law does not prohibit anyone from making a recommendation 3) Hanks did not
orchestrate the fact that the corporation was insolvent, and did not have the funds to pay its obligations to creditors. 4) Hanks did not orchestrate the fact that the President was becoming
older and his continued participation was being impaired. 5) Hanks did not orchestrate the
fact that parties interested in development had not been willing to comply with sound business
principles, as required by the corporation, to protect the corporation. 6) Hanks did agree with the
shareholders and the directors that something had to be done. 7) Alternatives were considered
and the results were that a majority of the shareholders present at the shareholders meeting
agreed that it would be in the best interest of the corporation to satisfy the legitimate obligations
owed by the corporation through the liquidation of assets, and then to dissolve the corporation.
8) Hanks did not orchestrate the fact that the president asked the Appellee Hanks to conduct the
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meeting of January 23, 2005, which led to the discussion and vote to liquidate and then to dissolve the corporation.
The Appellants statements on his page 30, par. 3 that: "GSC was subsequently the subject
of an administrative dissolution. The Appellant noted that the record indicates that on February
13, 2002, the State of Utah dissolved GSC. (R. 258); Ex. 54. The trial court found that "the state
of Utah by administrative action dissolved the corporation" after GSC failed to pay corporate
taxes and file an annual report as required by law", is incorrect because: 1) the shareholders of
GSC voted to dissolve the corporation on January 23, 2003. 2) Articles of Dissolution were
mailed January 27. Proper notice having been provided to the State Of Utah, but may not have
been recorded because the State of Utah, "according to the Appellant", dissolved the Corporation on February 13, 2002. 3) The record of the Utah clerk will show that the clerk advised
the Secretary of GSC (Appellee Hanks) that it was not interested in pursuing the matter any
further with an insolvent corporation.
The Appellants statement on his page 30, par. 4 that:
"Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1421 provides that
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), a corporation
administratively dissolved under this section continues its corporate
existence but may not carry on any business except:
(i) the business necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and
affairs under Section 16-lOa-1405; and
(i) give notice to claimants in the manner provided in Section
16-10a-1406 and 16-10a-1407.
Does not apply because: 1) Only the business of liquidation and dissolvement was conducted after the date of January 23, 2002. 2) It was the understanding of all corporate
officers and directors that there were no legitimate creditors that had not vacated their
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claims except the Appellee Douglas Hanks.
The Appellants statements on his page 3K par. 1 that: UGSC was obligated by virtue of its
administrative dissolution to adhere to the provisions of sections 16-lOa-1405, 1406, and 1407.
However, GSC's dissolution-related transfer of its entire assets to an individual whom the trial
court did not recognize as a creditor or majority stockholder violates Utah dissolution statutes
16-lOa-1405 and 1421" are not correct because: 1) GSC complied with the requirements of the
above noted statutes when they applied to the present case. 2) The trial court provided tacit
recognition of the Appellee Hanks as a legitimate creditor when, "The Court finds that four Patented mining claims were properly transferred to Mr. Hanks for obligations due and owing to
him by GSC."
The Appellants statement on his page 31, par. 2 that: "GSC's failure to give notice to creditors violated Utah notice statutes 16-lOa-1406 and 1407. Utah Code Ann. § 16-lOa-1405 provides, in relevant part, that a dissolved corporation may not carry on any business except that
appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs, including:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

collecting its assets;
disposing of its properties that will not be distributed in kind to its shareholders;
discharging or making provision for discharging its liabilities;
distributing its remaining property among its shareholders according to their
interest;

(e)

doing every other act necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs",

is not correct because: 1) It was the understanding of all corporate officers and directors that
there were no legitimate creditors that had not vacated their claims except the Appellee Douglas
Hanks. 2) GSC complied with the requirements of the above noted statutes when they applied
to the present case.
The Appellants statements on his page 3 K par. 3 that: "GSC's transfer of the four patented
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mining claims to Appellee Hanks and to COG was not "appropriate to wind up and liquidate its
business and affairs." GSC did not (a) collect its assets. A reasonable collection of assets would
require an appraisal to determine the value of the assets. GSC did not (b) dispose of its properties
that would not be distributed in kind to its share-holders. There is no evidence that the GSC
Board even considered in kind distribution or any disposal of assets other than the transfer to
Appellee Hanks. GSC did not (c) discharge or make provision for discharging its liabilities,
Although the Trial Court's findings recognize Appellant and the State of Utah", as creditors (R.
360 pp. 2-3), GSC gave no consideration to liabilities other than the alleged debt to Appellee
Hanks. GSC did not (d) distribute its remaining property among its shareholders according to
their interests. The transfer of the mining claims to Appellee Hanks ignored the interests of all
other shareholders. Therefore, this court should void the transfer of the mining claims and
remand this matter for judicial dissolution conducted in compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 1610a-1405.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-lOa-1406 provides for the disposition of known claims by notification
and Utah Code Anne § 16-lOa-1407 provides for the disposition of claims by publication. There
is no evidence that GSC attempted either notification or publication. Therefore, this court should
void the transfer of the mining claims and remand this matter for judicial dissolution conducted
in compliance with Utah Code Ann 16-lOa-1406 and 1407", are not correct because: 1) Except
for the four Patented Claims, there were no assets. 2) GSC had been advised a number of times
that a proper testing program for all of the claims, which could determine the value, would cost
well over $ 250,000.00. GSC was insolvent 3) If GSC had the money for a proper appraisal it
would not have been dissolved 4) The position by the Trustee in the H & H Gold Bankruptcy
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suggests that the property is worth something less than $50,000.oo, otherwise he would have
liquidated the assets himself as Trustee, rather than turn them back to GSC for $ 5,000.oo.
5) Except for Hanks there were no other legitimate creditors that had not vacated their interest in
favor of the transfer to 1 lanks. 6) The State of Utah had no further interest. 7) The statement that:
"The transfer of the mining claims to Appellee Hanks ignored the interests of all other share
holders." suggests that Hanks was a shareholder. He was not a shareholder. His only interest in
the transfer was as a legitimate recognized creditor. 8) The Trial Court held that the Transfer was
proper. 0) The corporate records and exhibits show that the obligation was due and payable.

Hanks condescended when he accepted the four patented claims as payment. 10) After the
transfer of the claims to the Appellee there were no assets to distribute. 11) It would appear that
after all of the evidence is considered and the exhibits examined that the Court would agree that
the decision of the Trial Court was correct.

IX. CONCLUSION
This Court should not reverse the trial court's judgment that the four patented mining claims
owned by GSC were properly transferred to Appellee Douglas Hanks and should not remand this
matter back to the trial court for judicial dissolution.
DATED this

day of October, 2005.

Douglas J. Hanks, Appellee, Pro Se
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